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Locke: Economic Coercion as Plaintiff's Defense to Volenti Non Fit Injur

ECONOMIC COERCION AS PLAINTIFF'S DEFENSE TO
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA IN STRICT
LIABILITY ACTIONS
CHARLES T. LOCKE

The doctrine of "assumed risk" is one of the most rapidly changing
and diversifying tenets of law today. The basic trend that may be deduced from an analysis of the conglomeration of case law .is the attempt
to restrict and narrow the application of the defenses of "assumed risk,"
volenti non fit injuria, and "no duty." Texas is not without its contributions to this evolutionary process.
The recent decision in Messick v. General Motors Corp." may effectively serve to soften the well-established doctrine of volenti non fit
injuriain Texas. While the Texas courts have recognized the harshness
of the "assumed risk" principles which bar recovery to the plaintiff
without inquiry as to any justification for his conduct,2 they have been
reluctant to alter the situation. The Messick case represents the first significant inroad in this area. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the volenti doctrine did not serve to bar recovery in a strict
liability case where the plaintiff was acting under an element of economic duress.3 The decision is consistent with the overall national trend
to mollify the stringency of "assumed risk," and in some jurisdictions, to
abolish it entirely.4 A review of the various approaches taken by other
jurisdictions, as well as tracing the development of the volenti doctrine
in Texas, will aid in evaluating the impact of the economic duress
concept. Understanding the distinctions between the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and volenti will serve to clarify
whether these defenses bar the plaintiff's recovery in negligence actions
or strict liability cases or both.
VOLENTI AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DISTINGUISHED

The maxim, volenti non fit injuria, basically means that a plaintiff
who voluntarily assumes a risk of injury arising from a reckless or
negligent act or omission on the part of the defendant will be barred
from recovering from that defendant. 5 The policy consideration here
1 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972).

Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789, 792 (rex. Sup. 1966); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests,
Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 380 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
8 Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972).
4 See McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963); Siragusa v. Swedish
Hosp., 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113
N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962). See also 50 N.C.L. Rev. 425 (1972).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1966); cf. Walsh v. West Coast Mines, 197
P.2d 233 (Wash. 1948).
2
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is that the plaintiff realizes the risk involved and has consented to

chance it, thus relieving the defendant of any liability. The basic types
of assumed risk6 may best be shown by way of example; 7 first, the
plaintiff expressly, and in advance, gives his consent to assume the risk
and to relieve the defendant of legal duty to the plaintiff; second, the
plaintiff voluntarily enters into a relation with the defendant with

the knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against the risk;
and third, the plaintiff realizes and appreciates a risk created by the
defendant's negligence, yet proceeds to encounter it voluntarily. 8
In the above examples, volenti will preclude the plaintiff's recovery
where he has voluntarily and reasonably assumed the risk. However,
where the plaintiff's assumption of the risk is voluntary and unreasonable, contributory negligence may also serve to bar recovery. Thus,
there may be situations where both defenses apply or overlap.f The

primary distinction between volenti and contributory negligence is
that a subjective standard is applied to volenti in determining whether
the plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates the risk 0 while an
objective standard is applied in contributory negligence to determine
if the plaintiff acted as the "reasonable man."" Another distinguishing

feature of the two doctrines is that volenti may serve as a defense in
both negligence and strict liability actions while contributory negligence will only serve as a defense against liability for negligent conduct. Contributory negligence will not bar recovery in strict liability
6 The terms volenti and assumed risk are often applied to this principle interchangeably
by the courts. Originally, however, the volenti defense was limited to employer-employee
relationships. Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 6 (1966). Gradually, the majority of
jurisdictions applied the doctrine of assumed risk to cover virtually any relationship,
contractual or not. For discussion of the history of volenti and assumed risk see Bohlen,
Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. Rxv. 14 (1906); Gow, The Defense of Volenti
Non Fit Injuria, 61 JuluD. REv. 37 (Eng. 1949); Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1
(1966); Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 HAxv. L. REv. 457
(1895). See also Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610
(1943) (separate opinions of Black and Frankfurter, J.J.). Texas courts continued to make
a technical distinction between assumption of risk and volenti non fit injuria. They have
repeatedly held that assumption of risk applies solely to cases arising out of contractual
relationships, such as employer-employee cases, and that volenti non fit injuria is applied
independently of any contractual relation. Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex.
191, 195, 238 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Sup. 1951); Cummins v. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co., 319 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1958, no writ). However, most
jurisdictions regard it as a "distinction without a difference." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971).
7 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser
categorizes the types of assumed risk into three classifications while Keeton divides them
into six separate categories. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22
LA. L. REv. 122 (1961).
8W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, comment c 2 (1966).
9 Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 133 (1961).
10 REsTATEaENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1966). See also Levine, Buyer's Conduct as
Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627, 638
(1968).
11 Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 17 (1966).
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actions where the plaintiff's negligence consists solely of failing to discover the defect in the product. 1 Thus, it may be said that contributory
negligence does apply in strict liability cases, but only when the plaintiff discovers the defect and "voluntarily and unreasonably" proceeds
to encounter the danger, this being the overlap between volenti and
contributory negligence.
ELEMENTS OF TEXAS VOLENTI DOCTRINE

In the early Texas volenti cases, it was necessary to establish that the
plaintiff knew of the dangerous circumstances or should have known
by exercising reasonable care, and that he assumed the risks. 13 Whether
plaintiff should have been aware of the risk ceased to be a question of
fact for the jury, and instead, became a question of law.' 4 In 1951, the
Texas Supreme Court qualified the requisites of volenti in Wood v.
Kane Boiler Works, Inc.' 5 The court, in refusing to allow a volenti
defense, stated that a choice to accept a risk must be deliberate and
must be made with full appreciation and knowledge of the danger
in order that the plaintiff's action may be the result of an "intelligent
choice."' 6
The knowledge element of volenti became settled in Halepeska v.
Callihan Interests, Inc.'7 This case involved a gas well owned by -the
defendant which blew out killing Halepeska. The defendant asked that
the court charge the plaintiff with constructive knowledge and appreciation of the danger by virtue of his employment. The court, citing
Wood and Schiller v. Rice, s said that "for volenti to be applicable,
there must be actual knowledge and appreciation; or the danger must
be so open and obvious that the plaintiff is charged in law with knowledge and appreciation thereof."' 19 The court emphasized that volenti is
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

420A, comment n (1966).

Is Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347, 43 S.W. 508 (1897).

14 Levlon v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 117 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938,
writ ref'd). Plaintiff's stalled car was pushed off defendant's tracks while plaintiff's ignition

was "on," car started, ran out of control and crashed. Court charged plaintiff with

knowledge of the danger and barred his recovery under volenti.
15 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951). This case concerned the plaintiff's deceased hus-

band who was employed by the defendant to inspect welds on pressurized pipes. During
the course of an inspection a pipe burst under pressure and killed Wood. Defendant
contended that by the very nature of the work, the plaintiff should have known of the

dangers involved and that since he accepted these risks, volenti non fit
injuria should have
barred recovery.
16 Id. at 201, 238 S.W.2d at 178. This rule was reiterated in Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex.
116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952), but the court quickly added that the plaintiff would not be
allowed to close his eyes to open and obvious dangers. Despite Schiller and Wood the
Texas Supreme Court in McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (rex. Sup.
1954) again charged that the plaintiff knew or should have known the dangers although
their reasoning was guised in the cloak of "open and obvious danger."
17 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
18 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952).
19 Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (rex. Sup. 1963). The
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applied subjectively; that is, did the plaintiff in fact know and appreciate, as opposed to contributory negligence which is applied objectively
-- did the plaintiff act as an ordinary, prudent man might under the
same circumstances. 20 The same view was subsequently adopted by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.21 Following this line of reasoning,
it becomes clear that the court in Halepeska accurately concluded that
the "basic difference between contributory negligence on one hand,
and . . .volenti on the other, is the question of justification.' '22 The
"presence or absence of justification . . . [which is] the crux of con23
tributory negligence," is ordinarily not important in volenti.

The aggregate of the volenti requisites which were set forth in Wood
and Halepeska was concisely expressed by the Texas Supreme Court in
.. & W. Corp. v. Ball.24 The court listed the four elements:
The requirements for such a defense [volenti non fit injuria] are
(1) the plaintiff has knowledge of facts constituting a dangerous
condition or activity; (2) he knows the condition or activity is
dangerous; (3) he appreciates the nature or extent of25the danger;
and (4) he voluntarily exposes himself to this danger.
VOLENTI APPLIED TO STRICT LIABILITY

With the firm establishment of the doctrine of volenti, the courts
began to refine the use of the defense, first in the areas of negligence,
then in regard to strict liability. The application of volenti in negligence actions was quickly delineated and accepted by the courts. 26 Howrationale consisted of an approval of the "actual knowledge" and "intelligent choice"
concepts espoused by preceding cases. Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863
(1961); Dee v. Parish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S.W.2d 449 (1959).
20 Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (rex. Sup. 1963).
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 496A, comment d & § 496D (1966).
22 Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 381 (T'ex. Sup. 1963) (emphasis
added). For distinction see Myers v. Day & Zimmerman, 427 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1970).
25 Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 16 (1966). An apparent inconsistency arose in
.Halepeska when the court reasoned that "for volenti to be applicable, there must be
actual knowledge and appreciation; or the danger must be so open and obvious that the
plaintiff .is
charged in law with knowledge and appreciation thereof." Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 381 (Tex. Sup. 1963). This ostensible conflict was
quickly resolved the following year in Wesson v. Gillespie, 382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Sup.
.1964) when the court affirmed the denial of recovery to a plaintiff where the threshold of
the tavern was so patent as to constitute an "open and obvious" danger. The Texas
-Supreme Court, while establishing an objective standard of what is "open and obvious,"
hastened to point out that it required more than mere proof that the plaintiff appreciated the danger or something stronger than testimony that the reasonable man would
have appreciated the risk. Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 70 (1965).
24 414 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
25 Id. at 146.
26 In 1971 the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed volenti, as set forth in J.&r W. Corp. v.
:Ball, as a valid defense to all negligence cases.
Volenti is an affirmative defense to any negligence action in which the defendant
is responsible for a dangerous condition .. .or activity of which the plaintiff knows,
appreciates the danger and voluntarily exposes himself thereto. Rabb v. Coleman,
469.S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
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ever, several aspects of the defense as applied to strict liability were
left open to speculation until the Messick decision.
In most products liability actions, the plaintiff not only alleges a
cause of action for negligence, but also one of strict liability.2 7 In those
jurisdictions which abide by the comparative negligence doctrine, the
distinctions between volenti and contributory negligence disappear as
the forms of the plaintiff's conduct are blended into one category for
the jury or court to weigh.28 However, for the remaining jurisdictions
the issues are not as simple.
Texas, like the majority of jurisdictions, adheres to the general rule
that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability.2 9 However, as to the harsh doctrine of volenti, which is a defense to strict
liability, the courts have felt bound to keep it within justifiable limits.30
Ellis v. Moore,3 1 for example, held that volenti did not bar recovery
merely because the plaintiff knew of the defect. The court insisted
that he must have had knowledge of the danger and appreciation of
32
the danger.
In the year following the Ellis v. Moore decision, Texas adopted the
forward-looking approach to strict liability enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. 33 In Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales
The court proceeded to state that "the volenti defense in Texas cases has turned on
whether or not it was established that the plaintiff knew he was exposing himself to the
danger which in fact caused him harm." Id. at 387. In other words, if the plaintiff knows
and appreciates a danger, but the danger is other than the one which harms him, volenti
will not bar his recovery. Cf. Triangle Motors v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W,2d 60
(1953); Cantrell v. Markham & Brown Co., 452 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Holloway, 378 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); American Cooperage Co. v. Clemons, 364 S.W.2d 705
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); San Antonio Portland Cement Co. v.
Chandler, 360 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fabens
Ice Co. v. Kosinski, 339 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27 Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627 (1968). See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
28 See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962).
29 Hill, How Strict is Strict?, 32 TEx. B.J. 759, 767 (1969).
30 Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
31ld.
32 This view was reiterated in Justice Steakley's dissent in Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d
384 (Tex. Sup. 1971). Citing Ellis v. Moore, the dissent noted that knowledge of the defect
was by no means synonymous with knowledge and appreciation of the danger. Id. at 388.
33 § 402A (1965) Strict Liability-Special liability of seller of product for physical harm
to user or consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
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Co. v. Tunks3 4 an action was brought in strict liability alleging that
kerosene had been adulterated with gasoline, thus causing an explosion.
The defendant charged the plaintiff with contributory negligence. The
court in holding for the plaintiff relied on section 402A, comment n: 35
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
While both Shamrock and subsequent decisions 6 clearly stated what
did not constitute a defense for strict liability, they refused to commit
themselves as to what did constitute a valid defense. One author, commenting on Shamrock, observed that "misuse" may be a valid defense.37
The courts had three ideal opportunities 38 to apply volenti, as defined
in Halepeska and Rabb v. Coleman, 9 to strict liability, yet refused to
do so. The conspicuous absence of any application of volenti, that is,
without any element of reasonableness or justification, certainly indicated that the courts had no intention of binding themselves to the
harshness of the doctrine as it already existed in negligence actions.
EXCEPTIONS TO VOLENTI DOCTRINE
As early as 188840 the courts recognized situations which might ex-

empt the plaintiff from the harsh application of volenti or assumed
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
34 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Sup. 1967).

36 Id. at 783.
36 Shortly after deciding Shamrock, the same court reaffirmed its views in McKisson v.

Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Sup. 1967). Here the plaintiff recovered for
injuries she sustained while using a permanent wave preparation which she purchased
from a distributor. Relying on § 402A, the court rejected the contention that she should
have reasonably known of the consequences-a defense of contributory negligence.
37 Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV.
267, 280.
The court seemed to indicate, by way of dictum, that misuse, submitted under a
proper formulation and not as a catchall theory of contributory negligence, might
well have been argued in the case at the bar. Id. at 281.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise recognized the reluctance of the Texas
courts to take a firm stand on strict liability defenses in McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391
F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968).
It is evident from these two decisions (Shamrock and McKisson) that the Supreme
Court of Texas did not decide that contributory negligence is never a defense to a
strict liability action, but limited its holding to the principle that one who is contributorily negligent in failing to discover a defect in a product is not barred from
recovery. The question of whether that species of contributory negligence variously
referred to as "misuse," "improper use," "voluntarily proceeding to encounter a
known risk" or any other of the myriad synonyms used by various courts and writers
constitutes defensive matter to such an action was expressly left open.
Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
38 McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (rex. Sup. 1967); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d
779 (rex. Sup. 1967).
39 469 S.W.2d 384 (rex. Sup. 1971).
40 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Gasscamp, 69 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227 (1888).
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risk. These exceptions were implemented either by finding that the
voluntariness element was absent or, in particular instances, by repudiating the doctrine altogether. An example of the latter are those
situations which qualify as rescue actions.
Rescue Actions
The rescue exception to volenti is firmly embedded in Texas jurisprudence. 41 In these emergency situations the courts create a legal fiction in order to waive the defense entirely. They simply state that the
plaintiff's actions were not voluntary. In Sinclair Refining Corp. v.
Winder4 2 the plaintiff, a railroad employee, while working on the defendant's premises, tripped over a pile of slag, fell onto the tracks, and
lost his finger beneath one of the rolling cars. It was established that
the pile of slag was "open and obvious" and that the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of it. Furthermore, the plaintiff admitted that his actions
were voluntary. While the defendant contended that volenti should
bar recovery, the plaintiff maintained that he acted to protect fellow
workers who were unaware of the unattended, rolling car. The court
found for the plaintiff, stating that where a plaintiff acts under a
"humanitarian impulse" to prevent injury to others, the doctrine of
43
volenti should not apply.
Inadvertence
The volenti doctrine was further emasculated by a recent Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit decision, Elder v. Crawley Book Machinery Co. 44 This is significant because Pennsylvania, like Texas, has
adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts concerning
strict liability. In Elder, the plaintiff's finger was severed when she
accidentally placed it in an opening in a book fabrication machine
while working. The defendant, charged with the defective design of
the machine, sought to have volenti bar the plaintiff's recovery since
her actions were voluntary. The plaintiff rebutted stating that her actions were neither voluntary nor intentional, but purely accidental.
The court in affirming judgment for the plaintiff stated:
We conclude, therefore, that if the plaintiff's fingers became
placed in a dangerous position in the machine by reason of inadvertence, momentary inattention or diversion of 45attention, that
this would not amount to assumption of the risk.
41 See Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (rex. Sup. 1963); Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 17 (1966).
42 340 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ ref'd).
43 Id. at 504. See also Henshaw v. Belyea, 31 P.2d 348 (Cal. 1934); Cote v. Palmer, 16
A.2d 595, 598 (Conn. 1940); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Seler, 82 N.E. 362, 364 (111. 1907); Swift &
Co. v. Baldwin, 299 S.W.2d 157, 162 ('ex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ).
44441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971).
45 Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
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While this case could have been decided on contributory negligence,
it nontheless served to broaden the limitations on the fourth element
of volenti, voluntariness.
46

Hard Choice

This catchall for various types and degrees of duress has had the
most devastating effect on the volenti defense. Robert Keeton accurately stated the rationale for the "hard choice" limitation when he
said,
Why should a negligent defendant be allowed to escape liability
because the plaintiff chose to expose himself to the risk negligently
created by the defendant, if the plaintiff's choice was reasonable?
Should we not instead say that the defendant's negligence unfairly confronted plaintiff with a hard choice in which exposure
to defendant's negligently created risk seemed 47the lesser evil and
that, therefore, the defendant should be liable?
The crux of the "hard. choice" doctrine turns on a weighing of the
alternatives open to the plaintiff. Justice Greenhill offers the hypothetical case of a girl on a date with a man who begins drinking after she
gets in the car. He then gives her the choice to either get out on a
lonely road or in a bad neighborhood or to be driven home by the man
in a drunken condition. "A good case can be made that she does not
To what degree
voluntarily assume the risk by not getting out .... ,,48
choice involthe
plaintiff's
render
order
to
must the duress exist in
untary? This is not clear.
The scope of duress in other areas of law does not extend to all
pressures, however minor in character or degree. While the scope
of the concept in relation to assumption of risk probably should be
broader than it is in relation to some other areas of law, it seems
reasonable to require something more substantial than a mere
showing that in some way49 the defendant's conduct has restricted
plaintiff's range of. choice.
Since the 1800's, the case law defining that degree of duress essential
to constitute a "hard choice" has been voluminous. 50 The two Texas
In a survey of assumed risk, Justice Greenhill observed:
Recently some exceptions and limitations to this general rule [doctrine of assumed
risk] have been considered in cases where the plaintiff was acting to rescue others
from a risk negligently created by the defendant. [Also], there has been the development of the hard choice limitation. (Emphasis added.)
Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 17 (1966).
47 Keeton, Assumption of-Products Risks, 19 Sw.-L.J. 61, 71 (1965).
48 Greenhill, Asstmed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1,17 (1966).
49 Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. Rlv. 122, 157
(1961).
50E.g., Clayards v. Dethick, 116 Eng. Rep. 932 (Q.B. 1848) (plaintiff's horse died after
46
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cases which are regarded as "landmarks" on this issue are Gulf,
C. &
5 ' and Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. McLean. 2
S.F. Ry. v. Gasscamp
In Gasscamp, the plaintiff was injured while crossing a bridge he
knew to be defective. The bridge constituted the only route from his
house to town. The court held that the defendant's negligence left the
plaintiff no alternative; hence, plaintiff's acceptance of the risk was
not voluntary.53
A similar holding resulted in McLean when the plaintiff farmer contracted to have the railway company ship his produce in specially
cooled cars. When the plaintiff appeared at the loading dock with his
cabbages, he realized that the cars were not of the proper type. After
the produce spoiled in transit and suit was brought against the defendant, the question of voluntary assumption of risk arose. The court
held that the plaintiff's action in proceeding to ship on the defective
car was not voluntary since the plaintiff had "no means or opportunity
of relieving himself of the situation. [He] had either to ship them at
the risk of their decaying in transit, or to let them lay and rot at the
place where they were carried for shipment.

'54

Both of these decisions typify the "hard choice" doctrine which
successfully attacks the fourth element of volenti. That is, in situations
if he doesn't,"
where the plaintiff is "damned if he does or damned
6
recovery.
his
bar
not
will
risk
the
of
his acceptance
6
5
Economic Coercion
"Where the defendant puts him [the plaintiff] to a choice of evils,
there is a species of duress, which destroys all idea of freedom of election." 57 In the preceding discussion of the "hard choice" principle the
falling into an excavation blocking the only access to the stables); Central R.R. v. Crosby,
74 Ga. 737 (1885) (train engineer was killed when he remained aboard cab. in effort to
reduce the effects of the collision).
51 69 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227 (1888).
62 118 S.W. 161, 163 (T7ex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref'd).
53 Gulf, C. & S.F.Ry. v. Gasscamp, 69 Tex. 545, 548, 7 S.W. 227, 228 (1888)..
64 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. McLean, 118 S.W. 161, 163 (rex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref'd).
56Accord, Littleton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 442 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1971)
(woman slipped and fell where there was no dry access to the doorway); F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Freeman, 11 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1943) (store employee fell off shelf which was only
way to reach merchandise); Blanks v. Southland Hotel, Inc., 149 Tex. 139, 229 S.W.2d 357
(Tex.Sup. 1950) (woman fell down stairs when elevator was inoperative); Dunlap v. Executive Inn Motor Hotel, 404 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallds 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(woman fell on outside stairs when door to inside passageway was locked). Contra, Gulfway Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Pursly, 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (woman fell on ice which covered only entrance to the hospital). See also Comment,
Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYR. L. REv. 924, 933 (1969); Comment,
Products Liability: For the Defense-ContributoryFault, 33 TENN. L. REv. 464, 474 (1966).
66 Economic coercion is not a term coined by the courts but by the author. It was
adopted to encompass those terms such as compulsion, circumstance, and constraint which
the courts have used to define, in reality, the extension of the "hard choice" defense to
"economic hard choice."
67 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 68, at 451 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added).
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"species of duress" was limited primarily to instances where the plaintiff's only means of access were obstructed. However, that species of
duress which is economic in character, intimated by the court in Saeter
v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,5s has also developed into a viable defense to volenti.
The Saeter case involved an experienced motorcyclist, who, upon
discovery of a dangerous defect in the machine, continued to use it
until the time of his accident. Although the court held that he could
not recover because he continued his journey on the defective motorcycle without "the slightest compulsion of business or otherwise,"59
this case strongly implies that had the plaintiff been under some business or economic compulsion his actions would have been justified. 60
The consequence of considering economic duress, or any "hard choice"
for that matter, presupposes a recognition of the plaintiff's motive on
an objective standard. A weighing of the economic factors, however, is
consistent with the well-established "hard choice" exceptions and
the "reasonableness" element as introduced in the Restatement. The
Restatement, when referring to assumed risk as a defense to strict liability noted:
[T]he form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a
defense .... If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless unreasonably proceeds to
make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery. 61
The Restatement, elaborating on the voluntary element of assumed
risk, pointed out that not all species of duress exempt the plaintiff from
volenti.
The plaintiff's acceptance of the risk is to be regarded as voluntary even though he is acting under the compulsion of circumstances, not created by the tortious conduct
of the defendant,
6 2
which have left him no reasonable alternative.
Conversely:
The plaintiff's acceptance of the risk is not to be regarded as
voluntary where the defendant's tortious conduct has forced upon
58 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
89 Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
60 See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 140
(1961); Comment, 33 TENN. L. REv. 464, 474 (1966).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 35 (1965) (emphasis added).
Note that this is the section adopted in Texas by McKisson and Shamrock.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E, comment b at 566 (1965) (emphasis added).
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him a choice of courses of conduct, which leaves him no reasonable
alternative to taking his chances ....

The existence of an alterna-

tive course of conduct which would avert the harm, or protect the
right or privilege, does not make the plaintiff's choice voluntary, if
the alternative is one which he can not reasonably be required to
accept. 63

With respect to economic coercion, the Texas courts have had difficulty
in determining whether the duress was attributable to the tortious acts
of the defendant and whether such duress left the plaintiff with a reasonable alternative.
In McKee v. Patterson64 the Texas Supreme Court was divided over
the issue of economic duress. In this case, the plaintiff, a carpenter, was
employed to do overhead work in a gymnasium. The defendant ordered
the plaintiff to discontinue working to allow other subcontractors to
finish the floor. After completion of the floor, the defendant ordered
the plaintiff to resume working from the ladder, adding a warning
that the floor was slippery. The ladder slipped, injuring the plaintiff.
In a negligence action against the defendant, the trial court awarded
judgment to the plaintiff. 65 The supreme court reversed. 6 The majority reasoned:
In this case the plaintiff suggests that there was a breach of duty
because he did not voluntarily expose himself to the risk in that he
was placed in a situation where he had no alternative; he either
had to work on the slick floor or not do the work which he was
obligated to do at all.
So far as we have been able to discover the courts of this state
have never held that the necessity of performing his duties and of
earning a livelihood was such economic compulsion or constraint
as to render involuntary the workman's choice of accepting or re67
taining employment in the face of known and appreciateddangers.
The dissent was aligned with the English common law which does
recognize the economic pressures brought to bear on workmen under
the threat of loss of employment. 68 Justice Griffin's dissenting opinion
noted that "Patterson had no control over the finishing of the floor at
a time prior to the completion of his work. Patterson had no other
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E, comment c at 577 (1965) (emphasis added).
64 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
65 McKee v. Patterson, 263 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953), rev'd, 153 Tex.

517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
66 McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 526, 271 S.W.2d 391, 396 (1954).
67 Id. at 524, 271 S.W.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
68 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 452 (4th ed. 1971).
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alternative than to complete his work on the slick floor so furnished
by the petitioner."0 9
This dissent pointed to Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Wood 70 which held that
economic coercion may suffice to render the plaintiff's actions involuntary. Holding that the plaintiff did not voluntarily assume the risk, the
court said:
Generally, an invitee using the carrier's equipment for a business purpose is under some economic compulsion to do so, that is,
he must use the facilities furnished or discontinue his business
71
enterprise.
Despite the well-founded reasoning in Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Wood
and the dissenting opinion in McKee v. Patterson, the rule remains as
enunciated in the majority opinion of McKee. That is, the element of
economic coercion is not available to a plaintiff as a defense to volenti
in a pure negligence action. Economic coercion, however, was not
ruled out as a plaintiff's defense to volenti in strict liability cases.
ECONOMIC COERCION

MESSICK v.

IN STRICT LIABILITY:

GENERAL MOTORS CORP.

The most significant assault on the subjectivity of the Halepeska
volenti doctrine in Texas is the recent Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit decision of Messick v. General Motors Corp.12 The facts of the
case are essentially undisputed. The plaintiff, Messick, purchased a new
1969 Oldsmobile from the defendant's dealer. He drove the automobile
for business purposes for 4 months traveling over 15,000 miles. During
the 4 months following the purchase of the car, the plaintiff took the
automobile to the dealer on eight separate occasions for the purpose
of correcting two defects. The first defect was an acute vibration of the
front end. The second was a tendency for the automobile to veer excessively upon striking bumps or rough areas in the road. As a result
of these repeated visits, the dealer was able to correct the vibration
problem but admitted that he was unable to locate the source of the
steering difficulty and unable to correct it. After taking the car to an
independent mechanic for inspection he was warned that if he continued to drive the car in that condition, it would kill him. Messick
then demanded that the defendant replace the automobile, but received
no reply. Subsequently, Messick was injured in a one-car accident attributable to the steering defect, and brought a products liability suit
69 McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 526, 217 S.W.2d 391, 397 (1954) (Smith, J., joined in
the dissent).
70 166 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, no writ).
71 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
72 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss3/6

12

Locke: Economic Coercion as Plaintiff's Defense to Volenti Non Fit Injur

1972]

COMMENTS

against General Motors for negligent design of the automobile and for
strict liability. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff was precluded
from recovery by the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria. The plaintiff
stipulated that the first three elements of volenti, as established in J. &
W. Corp. v. Ball,7 3 were fulfilled; he had subjective knowledge of the
facts constituting the defect, he knew it to be dangerous, and he appreciated the extent of the danger. However, the plaintiff asserted that his
acceptance of the risk did not constitute voluntary exposure but was
compulsory due to the economic situation in which the defendant had
placed him. Evidence was introduced to show "his dependence upon
the automobile to procure his livelihood . . . [and] his economic in-

ability to purchase a second car while continuing to pay off the Oldsmobile." 74 The jury, charged by the court to evaluate the plaintiff's
voluntariness on an objective standard in light of these facts, found that
Messick had not voluntarily assented to the risk. The defendant appealed on the basis that such a jury charge was improper and inconsistent with the doctrine of volenti in Texas. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendant that volenti, as established
in Halepeska and J. & W. Corp. v. Ball, must be applied subjectively in
negligence actions.7 5 "Nor is there an element of duress of economic
circumstances available to plaintiff in a negligence action ....

More-

over, the reasonableness of the undertaking is not available to relieve a
plaintiff from the application of the doctrine." 76 After finding that the
plaintiff's recovery for negligence alone was precluded by volenti, the
court turned to the strict liability aspect. Noting that volenti in negligence was well settled, the court observed:
The question, however, of whether volenti as defined in Halepeska,
or something like volenti but with an element of reasonableness or
justification for the continuation of the use was left open in the
7
products case.

The court concluded, after citing several "hardchoice" cases78 and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A,79 that:
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2nd, comment (n),
represents the successful ingraftation of elements of contributory
negligence to the doctrine of volenti....

The voluntariness ele-

73 414

S.W.2d 143, 146 (rex. Sup. 1967).
74 Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1972). The defendant
contended that the plaintiff's proper recourse would have been to stop using the car and
bring an action under the law of sales.
75 Id. at 488.
76 Id. at 489.
77 Id. at 489.
78

Id. at 493.

79

Id. at 491.
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ment ...requires a finding of both subjective voluntary action...
and an objective finding of unreasonableness."0
The limits of the manufacturer's liability for releasing a defective and unreasonably dangerous product in the volenti area are
that the plaintiff's consent to incur the risk has been voluntarily
given and is objectively unreasonable. The plaintiff at bar was
entitled to go to the jury with the question of whether his consent
was voluntary
or was the product of duress of circumstances and
8
reasonable. '
The court affirmed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff stating
that under the circumstances of the case, where it was shown to have
cost the plaintiff one-sixth of his income to finance the Oldsmobile, it
was proper for the jury to determine whether "a reasonably prudent
man would have continued to use the vehicle or would have purchased
another while seeking recourse against General Motors under the law
82
of sales."
This decision injected an element of objectiveness or justification
into volenti which, until Messick, was foreign to the defense, save those
rare "exception" instances. More specifically, the decision acknowledged economic coercion as a species of duress that will counter the
defense of volenti non fit injuria in strict liability cases.
CONCLUSION

It is doubtless that many will cite the clich6 "bad facts make bad
law" and maintain that Messick was decided on "bad facts." Here the
plaintiff discovered the defect and pursued every avenue of recourse
available to him, yet received no relief. Are these facts uncommon?
Viewed realistically, if not pragmatically, it must be conceded that these
facts arise all too frequently. Seldom is there an instance without
mitigating factors to justify the plaintiff's assumption of the risk. For
this reason, as pointed out by many jurists,83 the strict defense of volenti
or assumed risk is antiquated. It has been suggested that the doctrine
be extensively narrowed, as in the case of the English or Canadian
view which requires an express agreement to assume risk,8 4 or abolished
entirely, as is the case in a growing number of jurisdictions. 5
SOld. at 492.
81 1d. at 494.
82 Id. at 494.
83 See Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 19 (1966); Keeton, Assumption of Products
Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965).
84 Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1966); 49 TEXAS L. REv. 591 (1971).
85 McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963); Siragusa v. Swedish
Hosp., 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113
N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962). See also 50 N.C.L. REv. 425 (1972).
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The controversies over volenti will become moot, should Texas dispose of assumption of risk and adopt a system of comparative negligence.
Conversely, if Texas is to retain the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria it
must be sharply restricted. While Messick does not introduce the
defense of economic coercion to volenti in negligence actions, it may
provide the impetus to allow such justification in the future.
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